Airfix 1/72 Shooting Star - Korean War

After reading a good book on a subject, I invariably get the itchy modelling fingers. So it was with the Korean War book from Max Hastings. I therefore bought an in period model kit to make. As it happened it was a "model I missed as a child", aka the Airfix Shooting Star (re-released in the Vintage Kit series for old nostalgic fogies like me to buy). As a kid I was still very much a "WWII Spitfire Propeller" aficionado. I thought jets were a bit like cheating and not as interesting as the "piston-engine" planes (see below, I did not quite understand jets, I thought they were flying vacuum cleaners):  

A bucket-list project for the winter months. This also means I will be on the lookout for Airfix re-releasing their Mig-15 [and as Bob Cordery pointed out .. The Gloster Meteor as flown by the RAAF and just as importantly, available in Airfix Vintage].

"The Korean War" by Max Hastings - Audible Book

I seem to have hit upon a good working theme, or problem solving rule. If I have an interesting book that has been sitting on my shelves for a very long time [denoting I was at least interested in the subject matter at some point] and I have not got round for one reason or another to reading it (or alternatively I haven't passed it on to someone else) - then, if there is an Audible version of it, I kickstart the learning experience with listening to the spoken word (which sounds a little bit like cheating). So far it has worked pretty well for me (yes, it is a bit like "still taking two bottles into the shower" and if you get that old TV advert reference you have my respect), but at least there is some knowledge transfer. The Korean War by Max Hastings got this treatment (see below, to be fair it works in reverse too, a good Audible book has caused a paper copy to be purchased too! Especially if there are nice diagrams and maps to be had in the paper copy):  

This book seemed a natural follow on from Mig Alley (which I also highly recommend) to take in the Land Battle element of the Korean War, with a little bit of naval Carrier and Raiding parties. It is also an old book, written in 1987 and was consequently I think a little dated with respect to the air war. Listening to the history I felt the giddy sense of nausea like a naval battle, akin to Jutland with the "Run to the South" and then the "Run to the North" analogous to the armies running up and down the Korean peninsular until they end up back where they started on the 38th Parallel - back to where they started from, which was very sobering! Not forgetting the Inchon landings. It was a thought provoking lesson of how much the world was in a dangerous place in the 1950's. 

I had not been aware previously of the intense danger of the period, the world tension and the novelty  of a New World Order that was slowly emerging and moving away from the pre WWII power structures. The world seemed to be awash with countless small fires. Absolutely fascinating. 

As I mentioned the air chapter stood out as a bit dated, clinging to the 10:1 kill ratio that Mig Alley (2019) robustly  dispelled, although it was very salient about the premature announcement from air theorists claiming "the death of" and "no need for" armies or navies, as the air force would do it all. To quote Hastings (p326-7): 

The experience of World War II showed that intensive strategic bombing could kill large number of civilians without decisive impact on the battlefield , or even the war-making capacity of an industrial power. Bombing could inflict a catastrophe upon a nation without defeating it. ,... Nor could the airmen claim that this problem had not been forseen. Alexander de Seversky was only one among many thoughtful students of air warfare. As early as 1942 he wrote: 'Total war from the air against an underdeveloped country or region is nigh well futile; it is one of the most curious features of the most modern weapon that it is especially effective against the most modern types of civilisation.'  .... it remains astonishing that ten years later, in Vietnam, they were allowed to mount a campaign under almost identical circumstances to those of Korea, with identical promises of potential and delusions of achievement , and with exactly repeated lack of success."

Yes, the mistake was repeated in Vietnam and who is to say that it is not being repeated still! As Mark Twain once said, "History never repeats itself, but it does often rhyme." 

The Korean War - Mig Alley

The Korean War is a war I know relatively little about, other than it was the real setting for the TV series M*A*S*H (not as many thought, Vietnam) and also known for the famous last stand of the British Glouster's on a place now known as Glouster Hill, where it was made on the Imjin River. A British Army last stand like traditional British Army "last stands", being heroic but tragically a battle that in reality should never have been fought in the way it was. I have the Max Hastings' Korean War book on my shelf (both real and Audible) long overdue to be read. However, within the Korean War itself, the Air War was a bit of a mystery to me other than the enigmatic 10:1 kill ratio claimed in favour of the United Nations (aka the United States of America) pilots. It was also the training ground and inspiration for the Mad Major/Colonel (Boyd of the USAF in developing his air war combat theories) producing the OODA loop - which also decades later greatly influence AGILE software development!. Thomas McKelvey Cleaver's "Mig Alley" book came as a revelation to me in many ways (see below, a shot of the enigmatic F-86 Sabre USAF jet - its aerial combat versus the Mig-15 legendary): 

I can highly recommend the book as it came as a shocking myth buster to me - (spoiler alert if you read on) as it revealed recent statistical analysis of Soviet era and USAF era data shows the "10:1 claim" to be far closer to propaganda that proven fact. That is taking nothing from the USAF pilots who attained air supremacy over the North Korean (aka Soviet) pilots and Chinese PLAAF pilots. The revelation is that in the early combat Soviet pilots in 1951 started off on the better end of kill ratio [0.8 - 1.0] because they were filled with combat veterans from  WWII - both sides were learning first hand "jet combat". The USAF was by comparison trained (in jet flying) but unbloodied (in actual combat). The longer term operational mistake the Russians then made was to swap in and out whole Air Regiments at a time, whereas the USAF consciously only replaced individual pilots so there was always a combat capable cadre for new, the younger pilots to learn from. They were slowly bloodied from "wingman" status to "guns" - learning their trade in the skies above Korea. Boyd himself never shot a Mig down but flew 22 missions as "wingman". The seasoned in theatre air crews then returned stateside to teach tactics to the rookies before they went out. The clever American logic was assisted by the fact that there was only two Sabre air groups "spare" so rotating formations out of theatre was far too troublesome whereas the Soviets had plenty of air regiments - all of which were bloodied in turn, so each experiencing there own costly combat learning curve (and allowing an American ascendance). Then towards the 1952/53 period the Chinese pilots took over the bulk of combat were initially poorer in training and so had to relearn the lessons of the Soviets. A statistical ratio of 4:1 (in favour of the UN) was more likely over the whole war, but the early war was very touch and go. Boyd's first gut instinct about the Mig-15 being "theoretically" better than the F-86 may well be true [Boyd came to think better US canopy (observation) and automatic hydraulics (reaction time) were the difference, but in reality there was also combat experience of the man in the plane]. By comparison the Soviet cannon was greatly feared, the Sabres were comparatively under gunned with six fifty calibre machine guns - later Sabres experimented with cannon. The final remark across all eras is that pilots always over estimate their kills, with a lot of damaged planes limping home (although total write-offs on landing). 

For me the software development implications are stark (for Agile), never underestimate the value of experience - aka don't go for cheapest staff available no matter how great your AGILE SCRUM MASTER is or OODA your method is (or what the Accountant says - that is a dangerous false economy)! 

Footnote: I am trying not to "scratch the itch" of an Airfixclassic kit F-80 Shooting Star, some other manufacturer's F-86 or even the F-84 Thunder Streak - plus the Mig 15 (ironical that I had an Airfix Mig 15 in my hand years ago and did not buy it, could not see the reason then!). I think it is the RAAF Boomerang thing all over again!