Patton hated the concept as he viewed the Tank Destroyer as another form of tank, but the M10 and M18 were not, they had thin armour and so were fast and carried a better weapon to that of the standard Sherman. Tank Destroyer crews were also supposed to be able to hunt enemy armour in closed terrain with bazookas and Tank Destroyer training including fighting dismounted with infantry. The Tank Destroyer (TD) battalions were initially kept separate from the Armoured Divisions but the infantry happily grabbed them. Later in the war US Armoured Divisions could find themselves with Tank Destroyer battalions attached, initially awkwardly but a useful combat synergy arose.
The "theory" was that the TD Battalions were Divisional or Corp assets rushed to a threatened sector facing a German armoured attack. They could move fast, get into an ambush position or turn flanks and they were highly successful, despite the "battalion formation" seldom being used in battle (see below, this book opened my eyes to the US infantryman's friend for killing enemy armour):
The battalions found themselves parcelled out in companies and platoons, attached to regiments and battalions of infantry. The higher ranking infantry officers had to be dissuaded from "seeing a tank", pointing to the open topped turret helped, which meant "clearing the path of enemy infantry in attack was essential"! Yes, as the Americans were advancing, the Tank Destroyers were attacking, by stalking and facing off the inevitable German counterattack, which was their forte. Tank destroyers always seemed to be in the right place, at the right time for the "wrong job" from what they were designed for, so they were used in many ad hoc situations, because the US Commanders had them to hand (and could not afford to wait until an armoured battalion showed up). Successful operations with reconnaissance and cavalry was notable, as unlike the tanks the tank destroyers could keep up with the recon troops. Their close training with infantry put them as ideal (far better than tanker training) to be direct fire weapons for infantry - and the infantry knew they had to clear the ground ahead for the Tank Destroyers. Tanks, being armoured, trundled ahead and got themselves into trouble. M10 and M18 were exceptional in this, the M36 was blessed with an excellent 90mm anti-tank gun but had the armour of a converted Sherman chassis. Some units changed back to M10s because it hindered their operations. Tank Destroyer units suffered less than infantry and tanks, so probability wise it was a good posting, but it was going to be eventful, you would certainly "see the elephant". Their biggest enemy was internal to the US Army, Patton and other armoured Generals hated them and the force was quietly disbanded in peacetime during the late 1940's.
The battalions found themselves parcelled out in companies and platoons, attached to regiments and battalions of infantry. The higher ranking infantry officers had to be dissuaded from "seeing a tank", pointing to the open topped turret helped, which meant "clearing the path of enemy infantry in attack was essential"! Yes, as the Americans were advancing, the Tank Destroyers were attacking, by stalking and facing off the inevitable German counterattack, which was their forte. Tank destroyers always seemed to be in the right place, at the right time for the "wrong job" from what they were designed for, so they were used in many ad hoc situations, because the US Commanders had them to hand (and could not afford to wait until an armoured battalion showed up). Successful operations with reconnaissance and cavalry was notable, as unlike the tanks the tank destroyers could keep up with the recon troops. Their close training with infantry put them as ideal (far better than tanker training) to be direct fire weapons for infantry - and the infantry knew they had to clear the ground ahead for the Tank Destroyers. Tanks, being armoured, trundled ahead and got themselves into trouble. M10 and M18 were exceptional in this, the M36 was blessed with an excellent 90mm anti-tank gun but had the armour of a converted Sherman chassis. Some units changed back to M10s because it hindered their operations. Tank Destroyer units suffered less than infantry and tanks, so probability wise it was a good posting, but it was going to be eventful, you would certainly "see the elephant". Their biggest enemy was internal to the US Army, Patton and other armoured Generals hated them and the force was quietly disbanded in peacetime during the late 1940's.
From a wargaming perspective the potential is great at the skirmish level (a supported platoon), especially when in late 1944 the US Armoured Division finally figured out how to use TDs in combination with tanks. TD/tank pairs with armoured infantry could bring all arms and manoeuvre to great effect.
I can recommend the book and was politely surprised that it was again a "Free" read choice for monthly subscribers to Amazon Audible.
Final Note: The late war 1945 Paderborn incident/battle reference in Tiger Battalion 507 was
also alluded to here, described as "a company roughly handled" as opposed to completely routed by two platoons of Royal Tigers. Interesting, it has got me looking at my 20mm US Tank Destroyer pairs (like the ark, I got them in twos) of M10s, M18s and M36s.
5 comments:
Another interesting book which covers TD doctrine well is Bryan Perrets "A Brief History of Blitzkrieg". Many of Perrets books are poor but this one is actually very good, and he makes they very sensible point that tracked TDs have been replaced in modern armies by attack helicopters.
Cool another book to read. It amazed me that despite their apparent superfluous nature, not being a tank and not being strictly a gun for infantry, TDs became incredibly useful as a "gap filler" - to hand where their was a problem and outperformed tanks in killing tanks and could blow up pill boxes for the infantry.
The German Memoir I recently posted on my blog (D Day Tank Hunter) covered much the same ground. I was amazed by the utility of a bunch of lightly armoured halftracks mounting Pak 40s. Of course if anything actually hit them, they were very vulnerable, but that happened very rarely. Perhaps the M3 GMC was a good design after all!
Thanks Martin. To be clear the M3 Half Track and M6 Dodge were found very wanting but the TD units that had then were valued, they moved to tracked carriages asap. The TD battalions that had towed weapons were pitied because they were defensive and could not escape. At least that was my reading. The towed guns were seen as an anachronism.
Interesting from the German perspective too that teh infantry just needed a little bit of anti-armour to stop a not combined arms attack.
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